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Overview
• System reliability is often much less than estimated.   
– Failure rates can be ten times higher than anticipated.  
• Most forecasts of reliability are bottom-up best case 
estimates.  
– System failure rates are estimated simply by summing up 
the component failure rates.  
– Most failures are due to design errors, interface problems, 
system level effects, misunderstood environment, and 
human error – not components.  
• The fundamental cause of excessively favorable 
reliability predictions is over-optimism.  
– The cure for over-optimistic estimates is to use historical 
failure rate data from similar projects.  
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Over-optimism
• Over-optimism causes too-favorable predictions.  
– Confident engineers assemble estimates bottom-up.
– They include the known factors. 
– They ignore possible problems, especially mistakes.  
• The Nobel laureate, Daniel Kahneman, found that 
planning estimates are usually over-optimistic.  
– Forecasts are unrealistically close to the best case. 
– They do not reflect experience in similar cases. 
• Over-optimism produces two effects: 
– Very favorable estimates
– Overconfidence that the favorable estimates will be met
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Traditional reliability analysis
• Traditional reliability analysis assumes that system 
failures are due to component failures.  
– Failure rate data is collected in handbooks and reliability 
block diagrams are used to estimate the overall system 
failure rate.  
– The system failure rate is assumed to be the sum of the 
component failure rates.  
– In the mid-1900’s, components such as electronic tubes 
accounted for most failures.  
• Now more failures are caused by poor requirements, 
bad design, manufacturing problems, software, and 
human error.  
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Objections to traditional reliability
• Unrealistic assumptions 
– All failures are due to component failures. 
– The failures are independent. 
– Replacing a failed part makes the system good-
as-new.  
• In reality, 
– Component failures are a small part of all failures. 
– Bad design or manufacturing produces common 
cause failures.  
– Repairs can be imperfect or cause other failures.
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Data on system failure causes
• The table gives failure 
causes for electronic 
systems. 
– Only 22% were due 
to components.
• A study of over 500 
systems found that 
"only 20% of the field 
problems 
encountered were 
hardware reliability 
problems." 
• Another avionics 
study found failure 
rates 7 to 20 times 
higher than predicted. 
6
Components (22%) Failure resulting from a part not performing its intended function.
No defect (20%) Intermittent failures that cannot be reproduced.
Manufacturing (15%) Failures resulting from errors in manufacturing.
Induced (12%)
Failures resulting from an externally applied stress such as maintenance.  
Design (9%) Failures resulting from bad design.  
Wear out (9%) Failures resulting from wear out.
Software (9%) Failure due to a software fault.
System Management (4%)
Failures to interpret system requirements or provide the resources required.  
Curing over-optimism using 
historical data 
• The suggested cure for over-optimism is to 
base estimates on historical data from similar 
projects.  
– Failure rates can be 5 to 20 times higher than parts 
based predictions.  
• A rough guess is that the initial system failure rate 
will be about 10 times the traditional parts-based 
failure estimate.  
• This suggests using two estimates, 
– the bottom-up parts-based estimate, and 
– a system level estimate 10 times larger.  
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Duane-Crow reliability growth model 
• Reliability growth N(t)/t 
= k t-α
• Duane used a visual line 
fit, Crow used model-
based computation. 
• But failure rate does not 
really drop to zero.
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The abcd model is better
• The abcd model
Failure rate = a t-b + c, from t = 0 
to td
Failure rate = d + c, after td, 
where d = a td-b
The failure rate d could be 
corrected but was not.
• For the Duane-Crow data
Failure rate = 1.37 t-0.99 + 0.14 
from t = 0 to td = 100 
Failure rate = 0.01 + 0.14 = 
0.15 after td = 100
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Predicting the initial failure rate 
using the abcd model
• Failure rate = a t-b + c, from t = 0 to td
• Failure rate = d + c, after td
– Assume that d = y c
– a td -b = d = y c
– a = c y td b
• The initial failure rate at t = 1 is c y td b + c
– The factor y td b can be estimated from data.
– The larger td, the smaller d and y, so the 
range is reduced.  
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Initial failure rate prediction for the 
Duane-Crow data
• The initial failure rate at t = 1 is c y td b + c
– For the Duane-Crow data set, b = 0.99, c = 0.14, td = 100.  
– The initial failure rate at t = 1 is 1.37 + 0.14 =1.51, 
approximately equal to the first data point, 1.43.  
– At td = 100, failure rate = c + d = 0.01 + 0.14 = 0.15.  
• The reliability growth parameter b is typically 0.2 to 0.8.  
• The long term constant failure rate c can be estimated 
as equal to the total component based failure rate.  
• The scale factor that multiplies c is y td b, and here is 
equal to 137/0.14 = 9.8.  
– Comparisons to data indicate that this is a typical value.  
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Is10 times the base rate reasonable? 
• This assumes the parts-based failure estimate is 
correlated with the system level failure rate. 
– Both rates increase as parts count and system complexity increase. 
– The parts-based failure rate is a lower bound on the system failure 
rate. 
• But the system level failure causes include design, 
manufacturing, environment, operational, and 
management problems.
– These seem difficult to tie to parts count or to predict. 
• Can we do better?
– Prediction using reliability growth models?
– Engineering judgment?
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The initial failure rate is unpredictable 
• Reliability growth models assume that: 
– Infant mortality failures occur due to design and other 
errors.
– In early testing, these failures are found and fixed, 
reducing the failure rate.
• The time of the first failure determines the initial 
system failure rate. 
– If there are several infant mortality failure modes, the 
time when the first one occurs is a random event. 
• The initial failure rate is very variable, even with 
this simple model.  
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Engineering judgment is untrustworthy
• A space shuttle risk analysis found the solid-fuel rocket 
boosters had a failure rate of about 1 in 40.  
– But NASA made an “engineering judgment” and assumed 
a failure probability of 1 in 1,000 or 10,000.
• An Air Force review noted that this had no justification 
and suggested a failure rate of around 1 in 100. 
– NASA’s internal analysis assigned a failure in the solid 
rocket booster a probability of 1 in 100,000.   
• After the Challenger accident, analysis found that the 
probability of a fatal accident was about 1 in 100. 
– Even after Challenger, the NASA chief engineer thought 
the actual risk would be 1 in 100,000, “based on 
engineering judgment.” 
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Conclusion
• Failure rate estimates based only on adding  
component failure rates are usually too low. 
– Such over-optimistic estimates can cause 
insufficient attention to improving reliability.  
• Making a rough adjustment, multiplying the 
parts-based failure rate estimates by 10 
based on historical experience, is more likely 
to be accurate.  
– More realistic failure rate estimates can lead to 
better reliability specifications, plans, design, and 
testing, and ultimately to better reliability.  
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